On September 8, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control added 36 entities, including 27 Iranian airlines, to its sanctions list.

This action is part of 'Operation Economic Outcast.' The strategy is to further isolate Iran from the international financial and trade networks.

However, a question arises. Since Iranian airlines do not operate flights to the U.S., what effect will these sanctions have?

Flights will not stop immediately. That is not what the U.S. is aiming for.

The airline industry is somewhat different from the automotive or general manufacturing sectors. To keep an aircraft in the air, numerous foreign companies are needed for parts and engine maintenance, as well as insurance, finance, cargo transport, and overseas airport services. Especially when operating Western aircraft like Boeing or Airbus, it is difficult to completely detach from international parts and maintenance networks.

This is precisely what the U.S. is targeting.

Not only will companies that directly deal with Iranian airlines be sanctioned, but also third-party companies that help procure aircraft and parts and transport cargo. This latest round of sanctions includes foreign companies that assisted Mahan Air in securing U.S.-made Boeing 777s.

Mahan Air is a good example to understand this strategy. The U.S. has been sanctioning Mahan Air since 2011.

Yet, Mahan Air has not disappeared. It has continued to operate by securing aircraft and parts through third countries and intermediaries.

The U.S. is aware of this fact. Therefore, the approach has shifted from merely sanctioning one airline to also pressuring surrounding companies that help that airline survive.

This is where the power of U.S. sanctions comes into play. From the perspective of legitimate companies in Turkey or Malaysia, it is easy to understand. There is little reason to risk difficulties in transactions with the U.S. financial system just to earn a little money by dealing with Iranian airlines.

As a result, more companies are likely to abandon such transactions. However, this does not mean that Iranian aircraft will stop flying the next day. Iran has been under sanctions for a long time, so it is accustomed to circumventing them.

It is likely to endure by finding other intermediaries, acquiring used aircraft, and purchasing parts at inflated prices. But the problem is that over time, it will cost more money.

What could normally be procured for 100 may need to be bought for 150 or 200 through various countries and intermediaries. Acquiring aircraft becomes more difficult, and insurance and financing costs rise. Maintaining operational aircraft becomes increasingly challenging.

Ultimately, the core of this sanction is not to ground Iranian aircraft immediately. It is to continuously raise the cost of keeping even one aircraft in the air. In the short term, it may seem like there is little effect. However, if this situation continues for several years, the story changes. Aircraft will continue to age, parts will become scarce, and securing new aircraft will become more difficult.

However, there are limits to this approach. Making the airline industry difficult and forcing the Iranian government to capitulate are entirely different issues. Even if flights decrease and costs rise due to sanctions, there is no guarantee that the Iranian government will change its policies in the direction the U.S. desires. In fact, the inconveniences of rising airfares and reduced flights may be felt first by the general public.

Therefore, the effectiveness of these sanctions should not be judged by "how many Iranian planes have stopped flying." What the U.S. is aiming for is much more long-term.

It is about blocking the pathways for the Iranian airline industry to access the international supply chain, ultimately making it expensive and difficult to maintain aircraft.

These are not sanctions that ground planes today, but sanctions that make it harder to fly them tomorrow.

The essence of this action lies precisely there.